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The Neo-Assyrian Empire: 
Its Military and Political Policies against Ancient Palestine* 
Hiroaki Watanabe 
Abstract: Discussing the neo-Assyrian policies against ancient Palestine, this paper 
deals with various aspects: the coalition against Shalmaneser III, the motivation 
for the Assyrian military campaigns in the ninth century B.C.E., Assyrian policy 
change under Tiglath-p1Jeser III, Tiglath-pileser III's campaign against Damascus 
and Samaria in 733-732 B. C.E. .. Assyrian rule over Philistia and Judah, mass de-
portation and its objectives. Sennacherib 's campaign in Palestine is still open to 
discussion. We also overview Sennacherib 's expedition to Philistia and Judah in-
cluding the conquest of Lachish. In the decline of the Assyrian power, ancient 
Palestine again gained its independence. 
Keywords: Assyria Palestine Military Policy Israel 
1. Introduction 
The Neo-Assyrian empire expanded its territory with military might from 
the ninth century B.C.E. and reigned over almost all Mesopotamian states at its 
zenith around the eighth century and sixth century B.C.E. Assyrian foreign policy 
was influenced by the personalities of her kings or in times of royal weakness, of 
her officials. Following Hallo's scheme, it is convenient to divide the Neo-Assyrian 
period accordingly: (l)The rise of the empire associated with Shalmaneser III, 
which lasted for three decades; (2)Revolt and restoration under his son and grand-
son; (3)Forty more years of retreat, with three weak brothers succeeding each 
* I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Steven Olson for reviewing this ar-
ticle and suggesting necessary corrections for improvement. 
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other on the throne; (4)The Assyrian resurgence under Tiglath-Pileser III, 
Shalmanaser V, and Sargon II; (5)Assyria in its height under Sennacherib and 
Esarhaddon; and (6)The last forty years of decline and, then, fall (Hallo 1960: 36). 
In this paper, we focus on the empire's policy against ancient Palestine. 
Although Phoenicians, Aramaeans (Damascus), and Trans-Jordanians are related to 
our subject, we will not deal with them specifically; therefore, Israelites in the 
north, Judeans in the south, and Philistines will be treated in this paper. In sec-
tion 2, in addition to the battle of Qarqar, we will discuss the motivation of the 
Assyrian military campaign. Following sections 3 and 4, we will survey change of 
Assyrian policy, the problem of the Syro-Ephraimite war, and Judah and Philistia 
under the Assyrians at the time of Tiglath-Pileser III. In conjunction with Sargon 
II, we will cast light on the Samarians employed in the royal army (section 5). 
Discussion of deportation is placed separately (section 6). In section 7, the focus 
is on Sennacherib's campaign: the number of campaign against Palestine, and his 
action against Philistia and Judah. Finally, the decline and fall will be treated 
briefly in section 8. 
2. The rise of the Neo-Assyrian empire (859-829 B.C.E.) 
2.1 Shalmaneser III 
When Shalmaneser III rose to the throne in 859 B.C.E., he inherited an em-
pire on the ascent. While Assurnasirpal II was mostly interested in plundering, 
Shalmaneser annexed areas when possible, led his armies into western neighbors, 
and brought about the first encounter between Assyria and Israel. Ben Hadad II 
of Damascus had been attacking Ahab of Israel, but when faced with the common 
Assyrian threat, made peace with Ahab. Both formed the grand coalition under 
Jarhuleni of Hamath together with various states, and they fought Shalmaneser 
III at Qarqar on the Orantes River in 853 B.C.E.(Hallo 1960: 37-39). 
According to the record of Shalmaneser III, the main components of the al-
liance were as follows: Hadadezer, king of Damascus, with his army of 1200 
chariots, Irhuleni, king of Hamath, with 700 chariots, and Ahab, king of Israel, 
with 2000 chariots (Yadin 1963; 294). The fact that Ahab, king of Israel, had 
2000 chariots, which exceeded the combined total of chariots in all other allied 
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forces probably suggests that the army included the chariots of the king of Judah 
(Yadin 1963: 300). 
However, Na'aman (1976) doubts this suggestion. He thinks that even if 
Ahab could include Judah in his army, it was impossible that the force could be 
2000 chariots. By discarding the historicity of the Monolith Inscription from 
Kurkh, Na'aman suggests that the number 200 is much more suitable to the real-
ity of that period than the number 2000 (1976: 101-102). 
Shalmaneser III claimed that he achieved overwhelming victory at Qarqar; 
however, there are some evidence that the alliance was successful. First, the 
Bible remains silent in this event. Had Ahab and the allies suffered the defeat, 
the author of the Book of Kings would have described it to condemn him for not 
being faithful to God of Israel. Second, Shalmaneser's next three campaigns were 
conducted near Assyria while Damascus and Israel resumed their old conflict. The 
alliance fought Shalmaneser again in 849, 848, 845, and 841 B.C.E. (Hallo 
1960: 40). 
The coalition collapsed, not because it was defeated in battle, but mainly be-
cause Ben-Hadad, its leader, was assassinated by Hazael, his general. 
Shalmaneser did not wait long. In 841 B.E.E., he invaded Aram, defeated Hazael 
and proceeded to Hauran. In this campaign, he received the tribute of Jehu, 
"son of Omri" (Tadmor 1975: 39-40). The black obelisk which celebrated the 
campaign depicts the envoy of Jehu kneeling in submission (Yadin 1963: 394). 
2.2 Motivation of Military Campaigns 
By the ninth century B.C.E., the motivation for military campaigns was a 
multifaceted affair, but the original reason was to defend Assyria itself. In the 
ninth century B.C.E., the main purpose was to gain goods. Equally important was 
to obtain craftsmen and laborers. Plunder includes comestibles, equipment and 
animals, especially horses (Crayson 1976: 135). 
One major factor of campaign was the self-centeredness of the Assyrian 
king. He is the hero of the narratives and his unending desire for military honors 
led the army again and again onto the field of battle. This characteristic is 
closely related with the state cult, which asserted it was the god of Asshur who 
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led and assisted the king in his accomplishments. National pride, no doubt, was 
another contributing factor, especially in an empire ruled by a monarchy. Finally, 
deeply rooted in Assyrian mentality from ancient times was the very idea of mili-
tary conquest. Because each king wished to conquer more than his fathers had 
conquered, Assyrian conquest tended to escalate (Grayson 1976: 135). 
Yearly campaigns became the custom for a king. This practice was well 
founded by the ninth century B.C.E., to which the royal annals and the eponym 
chronicles are a tangible witness. The important thing was that a campaign had 
been carried out. It is certain that by the ninth century B.C.E. Assyria boasted 
a large military organization, which had to be maintained and kept active or else 
it would deteriorate (Grayson 1976: 135). 
No firm answer is available for why certain areas were chosen for the 
year's military campaign. In most cases, the reason for a campaign is not men-
tioned and it is possible that no reason existed. As long as no trouble spots re· 
quired immediate attention, an overall policy should have existed to direct military 
campaigns (Grayson 1976: 136). 
Shalmaneser III seemed to have an apparent expansion plan. Two fronts, 
the west and the north, received his attention, but there was a preference for the 
western front. Throughout his reign, if he was not campaigning to the west, he 
was usually campaigning to the north. Long range policy might have existed be-
hind this plan (Grayson 1976: 137). 
The Assyrian army invaded Syrian states, for twenty years, from the first 
regnal year (858 B.C.E.), and booties and tributes were gained despite some set· 
backs. The Assyrians paid attention to Anatolia for the next few years until 831 
B.C.E. A major policy decision, possibly caused by a complete change of circum· 
stances, led to the shift of emphasis late in his reign (Grayson 1976: 137). 
3. Revolt and Restoration (828-783 B.C.E.) 
Shalmaneser's reign saw a disastrous end. All of Shalmaneser's western 
conquests were nullified because of a revolt Nineveh and the other Assyrian cities. 
Shamshi-Adad V and his son successfully quelled the revolt, but the region west 
of the Euphrates was lost (Hallo 1960: 41). 
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In 805 B.C.E., Adad-nirari III finally turned his attention against the 
Aramaeans of Damascus. Israel regarded him as a deliverer since it was op-
pressed by Damascus; Israel appears among the willing tributaries in this cam-
paign. However, Adad-nirari III could not hold the west. This is suggested by the 
fact that his armies were engaged close to home after 796 B.C.E. (Hallo 1960: 42-
43). 
4. Assyria in Retreat (783-745 B.C.E.) 
On succeeding his father, Shalmaneser IV was faced with powerfully en-
trenched rulers in neighbouring countries. No change in the situation occurred 
when Assur-Dan III succeeded him. The Eponym Chronicle indicates the Assyrian 
weakness. Assur-nirari V succeeded the throne in 755 B.C.E., but Assur-nirari 
spent half of his rule in the land (Hallo 1960: 44). 
5. Assyrian Resurgence (745-705 B.C.E.) 
5.1 Tiglath-pileser III 
Tiglath-pileser III was a usurper when he ascended the throne. The west-
ern states paid tribute to him in 743 B.C.E. at Arpad. Menahem of Israel was 
among the tributaries while Azariah of Judah was a prominent figure among the 
rebels (Hallo 1960: 4 7). 
Tiglath-pileser III carried out one campaign against Philistia and two 
against Damascus during 734-732 B.C.E. Damasucus had formed a coalition with 
Pekah of Israel. This coalition presumably attacked Ahaz of Judah because he re-
fused to join it. Ahaz then called on Tiglath-pileser III for help and the Assyrians 
marched toward Palestine (regarding this Syro-Ephraimite war, see below) (Hallo 
1960: 48-49). 
Tiglath-pileser III conquered Ashkelon, Gezer, and Gaza, cities in ancient 
Palestine. He also razed Razor in northern Israel and captured most of Israel's 
territory including all of Gilead and much of Galilee. The inhabitants were de-
ported (Hallo 1960: 49-50). He claims that he deported all the men of the land of 
the House of Omri, but actually not all were deported (Oded 1979: 22). 
Although Israel became a small vassal state, it was not incorporated into 
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the Assyrian provincial system. This might be the result of an incident in which 
a pro-Assyrian revolt in Samaria murdered Pekah and elevated the last northern 
king, Hoshea, as a loyal Assyrian vassal (Hallo 1960: 50). 
5.2 Change of Assyrian Policy 
In the days of Joash (2 Kings 13: 5) or Menahem (2 Kings 15: 19-20), 
Assyria was referred to as the ally or savior, but this was transformed drastically 
to the new mighty Assyria, "eraser of borders" (Isaiah 10: 31) (Tadmor & Cogan 
1979 491). 
Before the neo·Assyrian empire expanded during the latter part of ninth 
and first portions of the eighth century, imperial rule was exercised through the 
agency of vassal or client kingship. Each vassal was directly responsible to the 
suzerain for the area under his control. The royal messenger served as a link be-
tween suzerain and vassal. The viability and strength of the empire influenced 
the efficiency of the ambassadorial system. A vassal king was to be punished di-
rectly in case of rebellion (Holladay 1970: 49). 
The neo·Assyrians transformed the previous scheme into a system where the 
populace was equal to the vassal. This means that the entire community was re· 
sponsible for its action. Though messengers continued to go from king to king, 
they also proclaimed the will of the suzerain to the people of the land, adding a 
new dimension to their activity. Assyria minimized the potential for unilateral ac· 
tion on the part of the vassal king by this democratization of responsibility. By 
the time around 750 B.C.E., this was well-established practice in Syro·Palestinian 
states. Both vassal king and populace were punished in case of revolt (Holldaday 
1970: 50). 
5.3 Problem of the Syro· Ephraimite War 
In the traditional view, the war was intended to force Judah to join the 
anti-Assyrian coalition in the area. There are several objections against this view. 
First, if the aim of Damascus and Samaria was to form an alliance of states 
against Assyria, it is hard to understand why they should weaken themselves by 
a war against Jerusalem: thereby, they exposed their northern flank to the 
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Assyrian army (Oded 1972: 153). 
Second, considering the political history of Syria and Palestine, wars re-
sulted from disputes over territories and boundaries rather than from conflicts 
arising in the course of attempts to organize a coalition against a great power 
(Oded 1972: 153). 
Third, 2 Kings 15: 37 informs us that the war against Ahaz was simply a 
continuation of the hostilities which had already commenced in the reign of 
Jotham. Hence, the siege of Jerusalem in Ahaz's reign was the climax of the war 
that had its origin in the political situation of Jotham's reign, and the intervention 
of the Assyrians marks the end of this war, and was thus not the cause of it 
(Oded 1972: 155). 
Tiglath-pileser Ill's campaign against Damascus and Samaria in 733-732 
B.C.E. had no direct connection with the Syro-Ephraimite war against Judah, 
which had started back in Jotham's reign (Oded 1972: 165). 
5.4 Philistia and Judah under the Assyrians 
The first campaign of Tiglath-pileser III was the beginning of Assyrian rule 
m Philistia. A document at Nimrud describes early Assyrian relations with 
Philistia. It is a letter to Tiglath-pileser from an Assyrian official stationed near 
Tyre, which said that he had sent orders to the people of Sidon not to trade with 
Egyptians and the Philistines. The date of this letter is from 738 to 734 
B.C.E.(Tadmor 1966: 88). 
There is a question why Tiglath-pileser III moved as far south as Gaza in 
734 B.C.E. It was probably because of commercial interests; the ways for the 
Assyrians to the Mediterranean seaports were blocked by Urartu and the Northern 
Syrian states (Otzen 1979: 254). 
The Assyrians were apt to avoid establishing provinces m this corner of 
Palestine and instead they maintained the vassal system regardless of whatever 
happened. For instance, even when Hanun of Gaza fled from Tiglath-pileser III in 
734 B.C.E. and sought help from Egypt, he was reinstated on his throne in Gaza 
when he returned from Egypt and became an Assyrian vassal (Otzen 1979: 256). 
According to Otzen, it seems that there are two reasons why Hanun was 
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not deported and Gaza was not turned into a provmce. First, the Assyrians al-
ways wanted to keep the Phiistine states as vassal states, so that they could con-
stitute a block of buffer states against Egypt. Second, the commercial interests of 
Tiglath-pileser III forced him to preserve Gaza as an independent state (Otzen 
1979: 256). 
The idea of buffer state explains the treatment of Judah as well as the 
treatment of the Philistines. Israel was turned into a province in 730-720 B.C.E., 
whereas Judah never became a province even after participation in several later 
rebellions. As is the case with the Philistine states, the Assyrians also tried to 
maintain Judah as a vassal buffer state against Egypt, on which Judah borders in 
the Negev and Sinai. It is noteworthy that even though the Assyrians were pro-
voked by a long series of rebellions in southern Palestine, they never departed 
from the fundamental idea of Tiglath-pileser III, namely, to establish and maintain 
buffer states (Otzen 1979: 256-257). 
5.5 Sargon II 
Shalmaneser V remained in the land during his first regnal year. In 725 
B.C.E., he began his campaigns against Palestinian rebellion. Shechem was taken 
and Samaria was invested (Hallo 1960: 51), but he died while laying siege against 
Samaria. 
After the fall of Samaria, Sargon II "led away as booty 27, 290 inhabitants 
of it" (Oded 1979: 3). The Israelites were resettled in Gozan, Media and Halah. 
Postgate indicates that the first two places are understandable: Gozan (Guzana) 
was a fertile area where the expansion of agriculture was extremely profitable 
since it had been deserted since the Aramaean incursions; Media was certainly an 
area whose own population had been deported. Halah is more puzzling, since this 
was a district in the center of Assyria, close to Nineveh and it was here that the 
new king planned to build a new capital, Dur-Sharrukin (Postgate 1977: 124). 
When Sargon received news of Ashdod's revolt, he dispatched his army 
under the leadership of the commander in chief, the Tartan. When the Assyrians 
approached Ashdod, Yamani fled to Egypt for help. However, since the Egyptians 
would not intervene, he was forced to continue to Nubia, but was detained there. 
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In the meantime, Ashdod and Gath were captured. To commemorate the victory 
a basalt stele was erected, fragments of which were discovered during the excava· 
tion. According to the Annals, Ashdod was organized as a new Assyiran province 
ruled by a governor; however, there is some evidence that alongside the Assyrian 
governors, local kings were ruling in Ashdod (Tadmor 1966: 94-95). 
5.6 Samaritans in the royal army of Sargon II 
The Horse Lists of Sargon II include the names of many of the top officials 
and the equestrain officers from Samaria and it is the only unit from outside 
Assyria proper that is known as a national unit under its own city name. This 
unit of Samaria is the only one out of seven separate units to be identified by 
using the name of a city or a national state. The unit of Samaria comprised 13 
equestrian officers whose title, raburate, can be translated as " commander of 
teams" and is used at this period both for chariotry and cavalry officers. Two of 
the personal names are combined with the name of Yahweh (Dalley 1985: 31-32). 
Parallel passage in the display inscriptions describes Sargon's siege and con· 
quest of the city of Samaria. He took as booty 27,290 people who lived there. 
He formed a unit of 50 chariotry from them, and he allowed the rest to pursue 
their own skills. He set his governor over them, and he imposed upon them the 
(same) tribute as the previous king. This passage shows that the deported 
Samaritans were allowed to pursue their own skills in Assyria, not in Samaria 
(Dalley 1985: 34-35). 
The remarkable thing is that Sargon imposed a tribute no greater than that 
of his predecessor. This is lenient treatment in the light of Samaria's rebellion: 
it had broken its oath of vassaldom, had held out against the Assyrian army for 
two or three years, had joined a rebellion soon after its capture, and was now 
changing in status from a vassal kingdom to a province under direct rule. 
Another point noteworthy 1s that none of the texts of Sargon's reign describes 
booty taken from Samaria. None of the Assyrian sources says that Samaria was 
burnt or rebuilt (Dalley 1985: 35-36). 
According to Dalley, at the battle of Qarqar in 853 B.C.E., the Israelite 
forces were distinctive for possessing chariotry without cavalry; in Sargon's royal 
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inscription it 1s significant that whereas Hamath and Carchemish employ both 
chariotry and cavalry, Samaria has only chariotry according to all the various cu-
neiform sources. Therefore, it appears that Samaria enjoyed considerable power 
from the reign of Ahab in the mid ninth century B.C.E. until the fall of Samaria 
in 722 B.C.E. supported by the use of chariotry without cavalry. The fact that the 
Samaritans restricted themselves to chariotry suggests a great degree of skill and 
confidence in that particular art (Dalley 1985: 38). 
Sargon, according to his own royal inscriptions, formed a purely chariot unit 
from the conquered Samarians, while he drafted both chariotry and cavalry officers 
from Hamath and Carchemish into his royal army. From Samaria, Sargon took 50 
chariots to add to the kisir-sharruti according to the display inscription, and took 
200 chariots according to the Nimrud prisms. The grouping in the Horse Lists 
shows that the Samarian equestrian officers were not split up into a variety of 
units to forestall disaffected groups (Dalley 1985: 38-39). 
The Horse Lists have identified one Samarian, Sama. He was m a position 
to act as intermediary between his countrymen, whether in Assyria or in Samaria, 
and one of the high officials of the court at Kalhu, Dur-Sharrukin and Nineveh. 
It can be inferred that Sama, the Samarian commander of teams who served 
Sargon as a reliable soldier, was a close friend of the king and had access to the 
members of the royal family (Dalley 1985: 40-41). 
6. Deportation 
The policy of deportation had already existed before the time of Tiglath-
pileser III, but it was under the neo-Assyrian empire that mass deportation be-
came a regular practice of imperial policy and the important means of its 
domination of other peoples (Oded 1979: 2). 
Deportation was not limited to any articular class or social group; various 
elements of the population of a conquered country were deported. Oded notes that 
the Assyrians deported men together with their families and they even tended to 
maintain the community framework of the deportees by transporting and resettling 
them in groups according to national and cultural affinities (1979: 22-23). 
There were two aims for deporting the men together with their families. 
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First, the Assyrians tried to prevent deportees from escaping to their homeland, 
both while in transit and after being settled in exile. Second, the Assyrians tried 
to show deportees their prospects of the settling down in the new place, in a city 
or in the countryside, thereby restoring and building settlements in Assyria and 
the provinces (Oded 1979: 24). 
There are three phenomena concerning the directions of deportation. First, 
Assyria was the main destination of deportees during the reigns of all the 
Assyrian kings. In eighty-five percent of all cases where the destination is known, 
deportees were brought to Assyria. The second phenomenon is a two-way deporta -
tion. In some instances, the Assyrians brought new deportees to a place which 
had been captured and from which there had been prior deportation. For exam-
ple, after deporting Samarians, Sargon II brought people from countries he had 
conquered. Third, is the phenomenon of scattering deportees from a certain city 
or country in several settlements and countries, and bringing deportees from sev-
eral settlements and countries are also common practice (Oded 1979: 28-30). 
Oded suggests that there are seven objectives of mass deportation. First, 
deportation served as a form of punishment for rebellion against Assyrian rule. 
Second, it reduced rival powers and weakened centers of resistance. Third, it pro-
moted loyalty among the deported minority groups, since their settlement rights 
derived from the Assyrian king. Fourth, deportees enlarged the Assyrian army on 
the borders and highways where the Assyrian population was relatively small. 
Fifth, deportation brought craftsmen and unskilled labors to Assyria. Sixth, it 
populated urban centers and strategic states in Assyria proper and throughout the 
empire. Seventh, it populated abandoned or desolate regions and helped make 
them suitable for agriculture (1979: 43-72). 
The socio-economic and legal status of the deportees was not uniform and 
their conditions were not identical. For instance, texts regarding the deportation 
of Samarians show the following points. Some of them were taken into the 
Assyrian army. Those who were craftsmen, administrators or peasants continued 
to be engaged in their occupations. An Assyrian officer governed and required tax 
from those brought to the land of Samaria (Oded 1979: 77). Because of scanty in-
formation concerning the Philistines, almost nothing about their status as 
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deportees can be known (Zadok 1978: 62). 
7. Assyria at its Zenith (705-668 B.C.E.) 
7 .1 Sennacherib and Esarhaddon 
Sennacherib's campaign against Hezekiah, the king of Judah, in 701 B.C.E. 
is well-recorded event in the Assyrian record and the Bible. After conquering for-
tified cities of Judah, Sennacherib deported "200,150 people great and small, male 
and female, horses, mules, asses, camels and sheep, without number" (Oded 
1979: 1). He even annexed western border regions of Judah and transferred them 
to four Philistine cities; thus, a new balance of power between Philistia and Judah 
was created (Na'aman 1974: 35). 
In 679 B.C.E., Esarhaddon launched his first campaign to Philistia and 
plundered Arsa, an unknown place near the Egyptian border. After sacking Sidon 
in 676 B.C.E., Esarhaddon established an Assyrian commercial colony near Sidon, 
the "Port of Esarhaddon." At this time, all the vassal kings of Syria and the coast 
were required to build the new city. Those kings included four kings of Philistia: 
Sil-Bel of Gaza, Mitini of Ashkelon, Ikausw of Ekron, and Ahimilki of Ashdod 
(Tadmor 1966: 97-98). 
In 672 B.C.E., Esarhaddon forced his vassal kings to swear to support the 
accession of his sons in Assyria and Babylonia after his death. However, in 651 
B.C.E., civil war broke out and when Asshurbanipal won the bloody war, the pe-
riod of Assyrian greatness was over (Hallo 1960: 60). 
7.2 The problem of Sennacherib's campaign in Palestine 
According to Assyriologists and Egyptologists, there was only one campaign 
of Sennacherib since only one campaign is mentioned in Sennacherib's known an-
nals. However, some scholars suggest that there were actually two campaigns. 
The account of II Kings 18: 13-19: 37 presents a problem: Is this the rec-
ord of one campaign or two? For those who claim the two campaign theory, II 
Kings 18: 13-16 refers to the first campaign and II Kings 18: 17-19: 36 refers to 
the second. For those who insist that II Kings 18: 13-19: 36 refers to one cam-
paign, these two sections go over the same ground twice (Shea 1985: 401). This 
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question has been debated for more than a century without consensus (Bright 
1981: 298). 
There are two variations of the one-campaign theory. If the Assyrians en-
gaged the Egyptians twice, there was only one embassy to Jerusalem between 
those encounters. If the Assyrians engaged Egyptians only once, there are two 
embassies to Jerusalem and the engagement with the Egyptians was fought be-
tween them (Shea 1985: 401). 
One thing that is accepted by all is that the events described in the entry 
m Sennacherib's annals for 701 B.C.E. correspond to the events described by II 
Kings 1S: 13-16. There are four elements in this point. First, 701 B.C.E. was 
Sennacherib's third campaign and Hezekiah's fourteenth year (II Kings 18: 13). 
Second, fortified cities of Judah were conquered. Third, there was no conquest of 
Jerusalem. II Kings 18: 14-16 indicates that Hezekiah paid tribute but did not 
surrender Jerusalem, while the Assyrian annals refer only to the city's siege, not 
its conquest. Fourth, the amount of tribute Hezekiah paid is almost same in both 
II Kings 18: 14 and the annals. The former lists three hundred talents of silver 
and thirty talents of gold. The latter gives the same amount of gold with eight 
hundred talents of silver. This minor discrepancy can be easily attributed to 
scribal error (Shea 1985: 402). 
Shea attempted to show new support for the two campaign theory. He 
listed three recent documents: an Assyrian text previously dated to Tiglath-pileser 
III and Sargon II but now attributed to Sennacherib; a Palestinian text previously 
dated in the time of Nebuchadnezzar but now datable to the time of Sennacherib: 
and an Egyptian text previously attributed to Sheshonk I but now attributed to 
Tirhakah (Shea 1985: 417). However, redating texts will cause another continua-
tion of debate. At present, we accept the one campaign until further confirming 
evidence and discussion are presented. 
7.3 Sennacherib's campaign against Philistia 
In 705 B.C.E., the two Philistine cities, Ashkelon and Ekron, took an active 
part m rebellion. In Ashkelon, the loyal Rukibiti was replaced by Sidqa, his 
younger brother. In Ekron, Hezekiah intervened. deposed the loyal Assyrian 
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vassal, took him captive to Jerusalem, and left the city in the hands of local nobil· 
ity of the rebellion. In response to this, Sennacherib, in 701 B.C.E., advanced 
against Philistia (Tadmor 1966: 95-96). 
The sequence of events is as follows: The king of Sidon fled to Cyprus 
when the Assyrian army approached. Most of the vassal kings of Phoenicia and 
Palestine paid the tribute. Mitini of Ashdod was the only Philistine king among 
them. The Assyrian army arrived at the territory of Ashkelon, and Ashkelon sur-
rendered. The rebel king Sidqa was overthrown in an internal coup and a new 
vassal king ascended the throne. Sidqa and his family were deported, but 
Ashkelon was saved. Then, Sennacherib laid siege against Ekron; however, the 
Nubian king arrived for aid. Sennacherib fought against the Nubian army near 
Eltekeh. Sennacherib could not have achieved great victory since no cogent details 
of the defeat are given. Nevertheless, the Nubian king retreated. Ekron surren· 
dered and after Padi was released by Hezekiah, Sennacherib reinstalled Padi as 
the king of Ekron (Tadmor 1966: 96·97). 
As Tadmor indicates, Sennacherib conducted lenient policy toward Philistia. 
A change of rulers, usually within one dynasty sufficed the Assyrians. The fre· 
quently rebellious cities were not annexed as provinces nor was their population 
exiled. In addition, Sennacherib expropriated territory from Judah and gave it to 
Ashdod, Ekron, and Gaza (1966: 97). 
7.4 Sennacherib's campaign against Judah 
The Assyrian army advanced into the kingdom of Judah through its central 
section by setting up a line of approach and supply through the northern 
Shephelah. Capturing the key cities of Azekah and Gath, Sennacherib proceeded 
south and conquered the cities of the Shephelah including Lachish. A second force 
went up from Lachish through Beth·shemesh towards Jerusalem. This force was 
possibly reinforced by troops from the Assyrian province of Samaria. Tell en-
Nasbeh, Gibeon, Ramat Rahel and Beth·shemesh were destroyed by this army, 
which laid siege to Jerusalem (Na'aman 1979: 86). 
According to Eph'al, there were five methods by which an ancient city like 
Lachish was captured: 1.climbing over the wall. 2.breaching the wall, 3. 
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undermining the wall, 4.starvation by siege, and 5.stratagem. The Assyrian ac· 
counts of Sennacherib's campaign in Palestine ascribe the conquest of fortified cities 
of Judah to methods 1 and 3, and the battle for Jerusalem to 4 which requires 
protracted operation. According to the reliefs depicted in Room 36 of Sennacherib's 
palace at Nineveh, the conquest of Lachish was conducted by the breaching 
method. This method can be divided functionally and sequentially into three 
phases. First, a siege ramp was constructed against the city wall. Second, batter· 
ing rams were brought against the wall. Third, the wall was battered and broken 
through, and troops went through the breach, spreading onslaught over the city 
(Eph'al 1984: 60). 
According to the reliefs of Sennacherib, the Lachishite prisoners are led be· 
fore the king. Some wear long garments and are bare-headed. These are singled 
out for displeasure and are beheaded or flayed alive. The others, if men, wear a 
peculiar head-dress consisting of a scarf, the end of which hangs down. These 
seem to be left to go free. This difference probably shows that the men in the 
long dresses must be Hezekiah's men, the Jews who led the city to resist and that 
the men with the peculiar head-dresses are native inhabitants of Lachish. A 
sculpture from a different part of the palace, depicting the procession to the Ishtar 
Temple, shows that some Lachishites were enlisted into the bodyguard of 
Sennacherib, where they were allowed to wear their own uniform (Barnett 1958: 
163-164). 
Two conclusions concerning the city of Lachish that can be drawn from the 
excavation are as follows: Lachish was a strongly fortified city, probably the 
strongest in Judah after Jerusalem in 701 B.C.E.; Lachish was conquered, burnt 
and razed to the ground by the Assyrian army m 701 B.C.E. Many Lachishites 
were killed by the Assyrian soldiers either m the battle, or after having been 
taken into captivity. Evidence for slaughter was found in Tomb 120, which con· 
tained a mass burial of about 1500 persons (Ussishkin 1977: 30-53). 
Although Elat (1975) insists that Lachish remained the seat of a governor 
and occupation troops in the service of the Assyrian king, Ussishkin (1977) negates 
his idea. It appears plausible that the city was left ruined and deserted during 
a large part of the seventh century B.C.E. even though a few people might have 
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continued to live in the ruined city. The habitation remams were found only 
above the city gate so far (1977: 53). 
8. Decline and Fall (668-609 B.C.E.) 
Asshurbanipal moved quickly to control the uprising of all the western ter-
ritories in 640 B.C.E. When the Assyrian king approached, people in Judah slew 
the rebels and made Josiah king to avoid further Assyrian retribution. Josiah 
later began to conduct anti-Assyrian policy and at the death of Asshurbanipal in 
627 B.C.E., Josiah annexed the Assyrian provinces of Samaria, Gilead and Galilee 
(Hallo 1960: 61). 
There is no reference to the Philistine cities from the latter part of 
Asshurbanipal's reign. It seems that Ashkelon and Gaza paid tribute as long as 
Assyria prevailed in Ashdod and in Samaria. Assyria's rule rapidly declined after 
the death of Asshurbanipal; Egypt and Judah now claimed Philistia (Tadmor 1966: 
101). 
9. Conclusion 
We have discussed the neo-Assyrian policies against ancient Palestine in 
seven sections: In section 2, we saw how the coalition of western states opposed 
Shalmaneser III and that the motivation for the Assyrian military campaigns m 
the ninth century B.C.E. consisted of a number of interwoven factors. 
After the intersession discussed in sections 3 and 4, Assyrian policy was 
changed under Tiglath-pileser Iii as we surveyed in section 5. We also clarified 
that Tiglath-pileser Ill's campaign against Damascus and Samaria in 733-732 
B.C.E. had no direct connection with the Syro-Ephraimite war against Judah. 
Moreover, it should be noted that Assyrian rule over Philistia and Judah was dic-
tated by their effort to establish buffer states against Egypt. It is remarkable that 
some deported Samarians served Sargon II as his royal army. 
Concerning mass deportation (section 6), we synthesized three phenomena 
about the directions of deportation and seven objectives of deportation. In section 
7, we summarized the problem of Sennacherib's campaign in Palestine: There is 
a question of how many times the king conducted his military expedition. 
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Although we hold the position that there was only one campaign, this issue is still 
open to discussion. We also overviewed the king's expedition concerning Philistia 
and Judah including the conquest of Lachish. In the decline of Assyrian power, 
ancient Palestine, which had been tossed by military might, again gained its inde-
pendence (section 8). 
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